Dr. Denis Mukwege or the Spokesman for the conscience of peace and justice for all in the Congo
Dr. Denis Mukwege — 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Congolese gynecologist — has been the target of multiple threats since speaking out against recent spikes in violence in eastern DRC. A wide range of NGOs and international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, have condemned death threats made against Dr. Mukwege and called for immediate action to protect him. These renewed death threats appear to be related to Dr. Mukwege’s advocacy of the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the serious crimes committed against the civilian population in the DRC, according to the recommendations of the 2010 UN Mapping Report on crimes committed in the DRC. Obviously, his advocacy to end impunity is disturbing to some people in the African Great Lake region. In this regard, on July 18, 2020, Rwanda’s former minister of defense general James Kabarebe denounced Dr. Mukwege on state television accusing him of being one of “those who spread false propaganda of Rwandan army killing civilians in Congo”. Kabarebe’s remark was immediately followed by the ongoing waves of death threats, both online and offline, most of which are obviously manipulative and aiming at tarnishing the image of Dr. Mukwege.
One such manipulation is well illustrated in an article released on August 14 on the Mediapart Blog of Mr. Manzi-Ye (former ambassador of Rwanda to the UN), titled “Dr. Denis Mukwege or the Nobel Laureate with two faces,”[1] authored by Gaston Nganguzi Rwasamanzi. The article accuses Dr. Mukwege of not being sympathetic to officers of certain origin by observing that the presence of the “predominantly Banyamulenge AFDL troops,” which, as it claims, “has been a terrible humiliation in the eyes of Dr. Mukwege.” The Banyamulenge the article is referring to include some high-profile officers in the 1996–98 AFDL and related wars such as the then-former Chief of Staff of the DRC Army James Kabarebe (who later became Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army and Minister of Defense), Laurent-Nkunda, Jules Mutebesi, Eric Ruhorimbere/Rorimbere,[2] and many others. The article does not say what happened to these “Banyamulenge Congolese” officers, and especially the threat they have posed to the security of the civilian populations of the DRC since 1996. Most of these “Banyamulenge Congolese” officers have been identified as responsible for crimes against humanity or put under international sanctions. For instance, in a leaked UN document on October 18, 2012, General Kabarebe was identified as being the “de facto commander of militia accused of rape and other atrocities in the DRC.”[3] Importantly, this leaked UN report triggered the freezing of some foreign aid from the United States, Great Britain, the European Union, Sweden, and the Netherlands to Rwanda, as “General Kabarebe was almost universally reviled for his role in destabilizing the mineral-rich DRC at a cost of several million lives.”[4] Moreover, the recruitment of “Congolese rebels” continued to take place in Rwanda under the supervision of General Kabarebe, as evidenced by a statement in a UN document (S/2012/843) of November 12, 2012[5] (see Point 24, page 11) that “Gen. Kabarebe was ultimately responsible for all M23 recruitment” and that he “ordered loyal Rwandan armed forces officers to facilitate recruitment operations within Rwanda.” Even worse, his efforts to instrumentalize the “Banyamulenge” by recruiting “young Banyamulenge throughout the Great Lake region, including from refugee camps in Rwanda and Uganda,” to join the rebellion in the DRC are described on pages 21–23 of this UN document. As is well known, those soldiers recruited in Rwanda were later integrated into the FARDC. Thus, why would any Congolese, let alone Dr. Mukwege, be proud of such officers?
Moreover, critics of Dr. Mukwege implicitly assume that justice was relevant for crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 but not for similar crimes committed in the DRC in the following years. Dr. Mukwege is being accused of reiterating the very same rationale and arguments used in favor of the creation of international tribunals in Rwanda and elsewhere. In rejecting the call for the follow up on the conclusions of the UN Mapping Report on the basis of certain methodological limitations[6] inherent in this type of exercise, Dr. Mukwege’s critics quickly forget that in 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established despite similar methodological limitations related to Report S/1994/1157 of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for Rwanda. This report used as its basis investigations by several organizations, including the United Nations and NGOs. This implies a diversity of methodologies and factual limitations. And yet it was on this basis that the international community decided to create the ICTR. In fact, the former prosecutor at the ICTR, Hassan Jallow, observed about his report on the related investigation[7] that it was “simply a modest attempt to paint an overall picture of the human rights situation in Rwanda, a general view which will make it possible to guide future inquiries… Interviews with witnesses, for example, have been very helpful not only in knowing the incidents they have described, but also in corroborating other events and reports. However, as with other reports submitted, additional data are needed to develop effective files against groups or individuals responsible for alleged violations.” Thus, methodological limitations (including data gaps) were not a sufficient reason for not moving to the creation of a tribunal. It was clear that the report and early investigations represented the first step and that prosecutors associated with the ICTR would later conduct further investigations. Similarly, crimes identified in the UN Mapping Report on the DRC provides a basis for further investigations that still awaited to be done ten years later.
It should be noted that in the case of the DRC, the promise to fight impunity and the urgency of doing so have been affirmed in various peace agreements and related international reports. Yet, to date, impunity seems to shield the very same perpetrators, fueling thus an endless cycle of violence. To illustrate, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) reported a case of charges of war crimes against General Eric Ruhorimbere (also known as Rorimbere) and Commandant Shetani for crimes committed on August 24, 1998, in Kasika, Kalama, Kilungutwe, Zokwe, and Tchidasa, in South Kivu.[8] At least 800 civilians were killed, and the villages were looted and burned. Since he operated with impunity, Ruhorimbere was promoted to colonel in August 2003 and was made deputy commander for a military region, and became a general in FARDC. After a period of time in the CNDP, Ruhorimbere rejoined the Congolese army and later became deputy commander of FARDC zone 1 operations in Rutshuru. Still benefiting from impunity, in 2014 Ruhorimbere was promoted to the rank of general. In 2017, the EU put Ruhorimbere under sanctions for being “involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations in DRC.”[9] However, in the DRC he not only continued to benefit from absolute impunity but went on to be appointed Commander of the Nord Equateur operational sector in July 2018. This is the typical case of officers continuously benefiting from impunity. There is no shortcut to peace and reconciliation without breaking such a cycle of impunity and the incentives rewarding those involved in crimes.
Another manipulation by Dr. Mukwege’s critics consists in portraying his calls for the implementation of the 2010 UN Mapping Report on crimes in the DRC as unrelated to the Banyamulenge community. Truth being told, this UN report provides evidence of acts of violence against the very same population identified as “Banyamulenge and /or Tutsi” (see the Mapping Report, Section I, Chapter 2, A. Attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians, pp. 71–77; and Chapter 3, A. Attacks directed at Tutsi civilians, pp. 154–164). Clearly, bring justice based on the recommendations of the Mapping Report is of utmost importance to the Banyamulenge/Tutsi victims too. Otherwise, those who pretend to care about the Banyamulenge while rejecting the exercise of justice in regard to crimes against them are merely instrumentalizing the Banyamulenge community rather than actually fighting for them.
All things considered, these attempts to discredit Dr. Mukwege’s determination to use the same sound arguments that enabled an institution of law to break the cycle of impunity and achieve peace in the case of Rwanda are just acts of manipulation of public opinion. Ultimately, the justice and peace that Dr Mukwege is calling for is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it will not go away. We have to stand firm on the side of those who seek truth, justice, and peace. Dr Mukwege is doing his part, and so should everyone else for whom humanity still matters.
[1] This article is used as the main reference as it includes most of the manipulation and deceptive tactics commonly used by Rwandans online activists; voir Le blog de Manzi-Ye, Mediapart Blog, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/manzi-ye/blog .
[2] General Eric Ruhorimbere was suspected of being one of the Banyamulenge commanders who had participated in the assassination of 36 Congolese officers in the airport of Kavumu in South-Kivu on August 4, 1998, and in the massacres of Makobola and Kasika in South-Kivu from 1998 to 1999. In 2004, while taking over Bukavu, Eric Ruhorimbere was unsurprisingly by the side of the rebel colonel Jules Mutebutsi. For further details, see RFI (2018). DRC: Violence in Kasai, General Eric Ruhorimbere, a former rebel leading the repression, https://webdoc.rfi.fr/rdc-kasai-violence-kamwina-nsapu-onu/chap-02/index.html.
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/rwanda-minister-leader-congo-rebels-kabarebe.
[4]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-rwanda-kabarebe/newsmaker-kabarebe-rwanda-and-congos-killing-fields-idUSBRE89I1B720121019.[5] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s2012843-1.php
[6] https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf, p. 5-6
[7] C Hassan B. Jallow, Challenges of Investigating and Prosecuting International Crimes, in From Human Rights to International Criminal Law 437, 451 (Emmanuel Decaux et al. eds., 2007).
[8] Idem.
[9]European Union (2018). amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo; COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2018/1940 of 10 December 2018, Official Journal of the European Union,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D1940&from=EN.