Jalila Ben Amrane

Abonné·e de Mediapart

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Billet de blog 12 avril 2023

Jalila Ben Amrane

Abonné·e de Mediapart

EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA ‘S POWER STRUGGLE : THE GERD OR THE DAM OF DISCORD

Egypt has long been the dominant hegemon state in the Nile basin. However, upstream states, particularly Ethiopia, have recently challenged Egyptian hydro hegemony and taken various steps to change the status quo. One of these measures is the start of construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Jalila Ben Amrane

Abonné·e de Mediapart

Ce blog est personnel, la rédaction n’est pas à l’origine de ses contenus.

EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA ‘S POWER STRUGGLE  : THE GERD OR THE DAM OF DISCORD

Water scarcity, a major geopolitical issue in the twenty-first century, can exacerbate tensions among riparian countries and lead to disputes over water rights.
These tensions are related to the number of increasingly large dams, which cause alarm and create major water shortages in downstream regions.

Dams now exist on nearly half of the world's rivers. 
More than 50,000 dams exist, with Asia and America accounting for three-quarters of the total.Sub-Saharan Africa has only 980 dams ( 589 in South Africa).        
However, the African continent intends to close the spending gap by relying on its large hydroelectric power potential (45000 MW), which has only been developed at a 3% rate.                                                                                              The spectacular hydroelectric dam projects have increased and boosted the African energy market. (''Laūca'': Angola; ''Koysha'' second largest dam in Ethiopia; ''Mambila'': Nigeria; ''Caculo Cabaça'': Angola; ''Batoka Gorgeen'': Zambia-Zimbabwe, etc) .

Large dams were successful in the twentieth century, providing a variety of economic and social benefits (electricity, irrigation, navigation).                                                                                                                                                                                                               They had become "uncool" and "anti-democratic" by the 1970s (ecological fracture, trivialization of low flows, near disappearance of floods, infringement of the rights of displaced populations, economic cost, etc.).
Today, Chinese hydro-diplomacy, its "hydraulic know-how," and the involvement of public institutions (Sinohydro, Exim Bank, and so on) have kept them up to date on the African continent (40 dam projects in 22 countries)..

The construction of Africa's largest dam and hydroelectric power plant (the world's seventh) in the absence of an agreement escalated the conflict between Ethiopia and its two downstream neighbors, Egypt and Sudan.                     First , it was called "Project X" and then "Millennium Dam" before becoming GERD (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on 15 April 2011 .  
 It is built on the Blue Nile in the north-west, near the Sudanese border (15 kilometers) and upstream of the Roseires Dam ( 120 kilometers).    
It will be fully operational by 2025, with a length of 1780 meters and a height of 175 meters, a planned production capacity of 5,000 MW, and an oversized reservoir of 74 billion m3 (capable of retaining the equivalent of a Nile flood). It is one of the pillars of a massive investment policy of a "developmentalist State" vested with a "hydraulic mission" at a cost of 4.8 billion dollars without any foreign financial loans.  
It is part of a long-running dispute among riparian countries over access to the Nile's waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of Egyptians and Sudanese.

The first stone of the massive dam was laid on April 2, 2011, and the Nile course was diverted by 550 meters at a time when Egypt and Sudan were experiencing political turmoil.  
Beginning on January 25, 2011, a wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings resulted in Mubarak's ouster. 
South Sudan declared independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, after decades of civil war.  
This breaking-in-two  of Africa's largest country had a significant impact on the North's economy, with the loss of 85% of its oil revenues, 1/3 of its territory, and the White Nile Basin.  
This "strategic opportunism" of Ethiopian decision-makers takes advantage of the political vacuum created in Egypt by the overthrow of the government in 2011 and then again in 2013, as well as Sudan's division - to begin construction. (1)    Egypt has by far the largest water quota (Treaties 1929, 1959) and regards the GERD as a major threat that will push the country into severe water scarcity.  
According to some studies, its annual allocation could be reduced by 5%.

Ethiopia believes that this project is legitimate and justified by a severe energy shortage in a country where, according to a 2018 World Bank report, approximately "70% of the population lives without electricity."    
By 2025, the GERD has the potential to transform Ethiopia's economy and fully supports the country's development, both in rural and urban areas ( National Electrification Program 2.0, 2019).   
The Grand Renaissance Dam was one of several large-scale infrastructure projects planned for the 25-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) in 2010.   
The GERD is the backbone of this energy sovereignty, which will relieve Ethiopia's acute energy shortage and triple its current electricity production.   
Contracts for energy supply have already been signed with neighboring countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Tanzania ( 2000 MW reserved for export).    
According to the World Bank, electricity sales could become one of the main export items in the long run, representing 600 million dollars in revenue per year (revenue of 81.6 million dollars between July 2017 and July 2018)

Ethiopia's ambition is to become a regional energy hub and a middle-income country by 2025.     
The country experienced a long period of impressive growth (more than 10% per year between 2005 and 2015). However, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, a locust infestation, and the conflict in the Tigray region, growth has slowed since 2020 (2019: 8.28%, 2020: 6.1%, and 2021: 5.6%). ( 2 ).    
Growth is expected to be 7.5% in fiscal year 2022-2023, and the signing of a ceasefire with Tigrayan rebels on November 2, 2022, may entice foreign investment to return

Egypt is located in one of the world's largest deserts and has a long hydraulic tradition dating back 4,000 years, with the Nile considered its exclusive property.    
"Egypt is a Nile gift" (Herodotus).  
The Nile has two major tributaries: the White Nile (14% of total water) and the Blue Nile (80% of total water and silt).   
The Nile (6,700 km) meets up to 95% of the water needs of over 105 million Egyptians (2022), 97% of whom live on the Nile's shores or along its delta, which covers 5% of the country's land area.    
The needs are nearly 114 billion m3 per year, and water resources do not exceed 60 billion m3 per year, resulting in a deficit of up to 54 billion m3.      
Egypt has one of the world's lowest rates of water availability per capita.    
With no other water source than Ethiopian sources (59% for the Blue Nile, 14% for the Sobat, and 13% for the Atbara), Egypt appears to be the most vulnerable to potential GERD harm.      
Egyptian strategy aims to counteract anticipated Ethiopian energy power in the region as a result of the Renaissance Dam and to maintain its long hydro-hegemony standing over the Nile by any means necessary.

No other region is as reliant on a single river system as the Nile basin (which accounts for approximately 10% of Africa's land mass).      
The Nile is shared by 11 countries (487.3 million inhabitants: Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan: 241.401 million, 2015), each with unique needs and priorities, but also with common challenges: rising water demand, environmental degradation, recurring flooding and droughts, and energy insecurity.      
The population of these countries is expected to double by 2050, according to a United Nations report (2013).         Ethiopia will be the second most populous country in Africa, with 213 million people (a 2.33% increase in population in 2020), far ahead of Egypt, which will have 135 million people (a 2.28% increase in population in 2020)(3).           
The rapid growth of Egypt's population by more than 50% would severely limit the country's already scarce water resources: water availability is expected to fall from 570 m3 /inhabitant/year in 2018 to 337 m3 /inhabitant/year in 2025.

The emergence of upstream countries marks a shift in the regional hydraulic situation.     
Today, they want to end a year-long stalemate imposed by "anachronistic" Treaties and demand a shift in Nile management paradigm.   
For them, the Nile is an important economic river with enormous potential for economic development - and a means of eradicating poverty: five of the Basin's countries are among the world's 17 poorest (2019).    
Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia's strategy has served as a counter-hegemonic to Egypt's dominant position on the Nile. This strategy works in two ways: physically, by building several hydroelectric dams, and politically, by forming supportive regional alliances.    
Ethiopia signed a framework cooperation agreement with four countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania) in 2010; the agreement was ratified by the Ethiopian parliament in 2013 but was rejected by Cairo and Khartoum.      
Burundi has been a member of the CFA since 2011, and under international law, a coalition of six countries automatically acquires the right to make water-sharing decisions.      
In a Declaration of Principles issued in March 2015, Egypt and Sudan recognized Ethiopia's right to build dams on the Nile and its tributaries.  
They received nothing specific in return.     
This could be interpreted as a victory for Ethiopia's counter- hydro hegemony.

A series of talks have largely failed to produce a consensus among the concerned countries, with tensions rising again after Ethiopia announced its intention to begin filling the Dam.     
The dispute quickly erupted over the reservoir's filling deadline.         
Addis Abeba wants to impose its filling schedule and fill a reservoir of around 70 billion m3 of water in 4 to 7 years (i.e. 10% of Egypt's annual Nile flow), whereas Cairo wants a spread over 9 to 12 years.      
The reservoir's first phase of filling began in July 2020 (4.9 billion m3 of water); the second phase of filling was completed in July 2021 (13.5 billion m3) .      
The third filling (3.6 billion m3) was completed in August 2022, and the dam produced electricity for the first time on 20 February 2022.    
The lake now has a capacity of 22 billion cubic meters of water, and the fourth filling will occur in 2023 summer  .

Beyond the technical issues of filling, Ethiopia and Egypt are engaged in a geopolitical "race for regional primacy."         
Is Ethiopia waiting to fill the massive reservoir before imposing its hydropolitical version on all basin States ?   
The future will reveal all.      
Today, the situation is uncertain because, despite intense diplomatic activity, contractual negotiations are not progressing (UN Security Council, AU, American diplomacy, etc.).     
This ambiguity can result in either a regional conflict or "multifunctional regional integration."      
It is in everyone's best interests to practice a shared vision of resource management and to promote the establishment of a cooperative and regional integration system.    
"Ethiopia will supply energy, Sudan will supply food, Egypt will supply capital, and South Sudan will supply oil." Verhoeven, Harry ( 4).

Because "we have changed the era, the world, and the Nile" as of today. Ayeb, Habib ( 5).

(1)     ‘’ Ethiopia ‘s Hegemony in the Horn of Africa ‘’in Journal of the Middle East and Africa , 2014, p13 )

(2)      Egypt Population 2022 : countrymeters.info )

( 3)     In  Population Data.net : 20 novembre 2020

(4)  '' Géopolitique de l ' eau Entre conflits et coopérations ''- David Blanchon , Le cavalier Bleu , p141

(5)      L ‘Humanité ‘’Une stratégie éthiopienne d ‘affaiblissement vieille de 30 ans ‘’, 6 juin 2014 )

Ce blog est personnel, la rédaction n’est pas à l’origine de ses contenus.