La sécurité aérienne est un vaste sujet avec de nombreux acteurs: pilotes, compagnies aériennes, fabriquants et concepteurs d'avion, autorités de régulation, etc. Cependant l'organisation, et le mode de fonctionnement des entreprises impliquées peut s'avérer critique, surtout dans un contexte où la course à la rentabilité fait désormais la loi.
Je vous invite donc à méditer sur cette analyse faite le 6 Aout 2009 par le capitaine Rory Kay. Désolé, c'est une vidéo assez longue (20 mn) et en anglais (néanmoins, il parle lentement, posément et sans accent exagéré - pas mal pour un américain).
Ce n'est pas n'importe qui. Outre le fait d'être pilote, c'est aussi le président du comité "sécurité aérienne" de la plus grande association (ou syndicat) mondiale de pilotes de compagnies aériennes avec environ 54000 membres: L'ALPA (Air Line Pilots Association) dont le sérieux est reconnu outre atlantique. Le NTSB (équivalent US du BEA) l'associe très fréquemment aux enquêtes consécutives aux accidents et incidents aériens.
Voici le lien vers son discours: http://www.alpa.tv/DesktopModules/UltraVideoGallery/UltraVideoGallery.swf?vId=247&portalId=14
Autre point de vue très similaire quoique exprimé plus cruement:
"From an ex-EAL pilot –
I have had several emails asking my opinion about the Air France crash and before that, the USAirways Hudson River crash.
As most of you know, I have flown the AB330-300 in Intl. ops. for several thousand hrs. as well as, like most of you, multi thousands in Boeings. For the record, my Boeing time is in:707; 727-100,200; 737-200,300,400; 747100,200,SP; 757,767. I also have lots of Douglas (6 types) and Lockheed (2 types), Convair (2 types), & Lear(2 types).
With all that, here's what I see through my "caveman" point of view: Airbus philosophy has left the art of flying and therefore the pilot out of the loop. They train and design the operation so that any low experienced/low skilled person who is good at rote memory (read third world/read and do) pilot can get into this plane, with enough repetition and rehearsal; fly a normal trip.
FATAL FLAW #1 -- The engines are FADEC (read computer/electronically) controlled and the flight controls are fly by wire/radio signal. THERE IS NO DIRECT CONTROL FROM THE PILOT TO THESE CRITICAL SYSTEMS. Following in this spirit/phylosophy, the pilot training strictly emphasizes Always to be in the Automated mode - read auto throttles and auto pilot - in all operations even including a single engine failure approach and single engine missed approach! - i.e.AUTO FLT; ALL THE TIME.
Nowhere is there any contingency, training or flight manual information data for a pilot to take over manually and fly attitude and power settings for a certain configuration in the event that these auto systems fail. NOR are there any MANUAL, direct link controls to the engines/flt controls from the cockpit.
FADEC is auto control, all the time. If the Hudson River plane had allowed the pilot to override the autothrottles, could the pilots have produced some thrust? In the Boeings, you can "firewall" the engines til they melt or rip off the wing! In every other plane I have flown in the past 40 years, there is a section in the flt. ops. manual that relates to this. Mainly it is a table that gives engine-thrust settings and aircraft pitch settings for different speeds/configurations in the event
that the pilot's airspeed indication in not reliable. - REF Air France
FATAL FLAW #2 -- Airbus has incorporated composite materials into critical structural components in order to "one up" the competition with the "BEAN COUNTERS MISSION " of becoming a lighter plane with less fuel burn.
Example 1: The Airbus 330 has no wing spar from the point where the engine mounts to the wing all the way to the wing tip! Over time, how can a wing NOT snap off?!
Example 2: the Airbus 300-600 that AMR crashed at JFK has a honeycomb composite rudder with no spar in it. This failed on this Airbus aircraft.
In summary: The pendulum of commercial aircraft design has swung way past the point of prudent/safe design. The momentum for this swing is found in the fact that "bean counters" and "bottom liners" backed by political forces (read: Green, et.al.) have highjacked the construction and certification process of our commercial fleets to the point of producing unsafe passenger transports.
I predict that each succeeding accident will be blamed on:
"Pilot Error" like the poor AMR JFK crash;
"Act of God/NATURE"-USAir Hudson;
"Weather related"-Air France .
I support the premise that these official-found casual/contributing factors are but a deflection from the true cause - too much under flimsy, composite construction, and inadequate pilot input and over-ride ability to these automated systems.
Respectfully,
Jeff Hathorn,
Old School Pilot, Naples , FL"
Bon, il critique Airbus sur ses choix de conception mais Airbus a été le précurseur avec l'A320 (cf un de mes précédents billets). Désormais Boeing et les autres suivent aussi donc nous verrons bien avec le 787. Ce qui est intéressant c'est le fait de penser que nous sommes arrivé à un point d'inflexion (The pendulum of commercial aircraft design has swung ...) dans la conception.
La priorité est désormais donnée par les "bean counters" and "bottom liners". Ok, c'est un peu argotique donc une petite explication :
- bean counters - compteur de haricots (les blancs ou les secs) - Comprendre les comptables, les financiers, ...
- bottom liners - un actionnaire, un "responsable", quelqu'un qui met au dessus de toute autre considération la réalisation de profits en affaires
Je ne pense pas être démenti par les ouvriers de Molex.